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IncentraByplannedeconomies,domesticpricesdo  estimate  it with quarterly  data for
not respond  flexibly  to market  forces,  so economic  Czechoslovakia  and Poland,  and with annual
disequilibria  - including repressed inflation  - data for Romania.  Based  on the estimated
persist. Feltenstein and Ha assess the extent of  equation,  they  derive the true inflation  rate for
repressed  inflation  in Czechoslovakia,  Poland,  and  each economy.  Finally,  they determine  the
Romania  between 1980  and 1990.  significance  of the repressed  inflation  in each
economy  through statistical  tests on parameters
First,  the) develop  a simultaneous  equation  of the estimated  equation.
model, which  stipulaLes  that the repressed
inflation  is caused  by the difference  in growth  These  are their main findings:
rate between  households'  money  holdings  and
r Wail  sales in the economy.  Following  are the  * During 1980-90  in Czechoslovakia,
model's basic assumptions:  repressed  inflation  was insignificant,  the demand
for money  was mostly  for transaction  purposes,
A stable demand  for money  function  exists  and inflationary  expectations  were almost
where  the demand for real quasi-money  depends  myopic.
on the level of real income and the expected  rate
of inflation.  * In Poland, repressed  inflation  was
significant  but decreasing  after 1987,  and
*  flationary  expectations  are formed  under  inflationary  expectations  adjusted  fairly rapidly.
an adaptive  scheme  in which expected  inflation
for the next period  depends  on the error made in  * In Romania,  repressed  inflation  was serious
predicting  the current  period's "true" inflation.  throughout  the period,  and inflationary
expectations  adjusted  quite rapidly.
* The real stock of quasi-money  balances
adjusts  to the desired  level, after a time lag.  This economic  model  needs to be refined
and the data used need to be improved.  But the
Feltenstein  and Ha then  derive a reduced-  paper's findings  are broadly  consistent  with the
form equation  on real quasi-money  holdings,  and  results  of most other studies.
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I.  Introduction
A major issue in many centrally planned economies is how to coordinate
growth in the money supply with a controlled price system.  In addition, the
foreign sector is  not open and  the exchange rate, like the  domestic price system,
is subject to distortions.  As a result, changes in the money supply which are
not accompanied by changes in domestic prices and the exchange rate may lead to
repressed market demands and balance of payments disequilibrium.
In  this  paper  we  will  look  at  the  experiences  of  three  countries,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania.  The common experience of these countries
is, of course, the abandonment of central planning.  We see that each of these
countries has, to at least some extent, inflationary difficulties.  The aim of
this paper is to estimate a measure of the extent to which the price level has
been repressed because of the years of price controls.  We develop a simple
analytical model which derives a "true" rate of inflation on the basis of the
different rates of change of the stock of money in circulation and the nominal
value of retail sales.  This true rate of inflation is then used to explain
changes in quasi-money balances.  We estimate this  model for both Czechoslovakia
and Poland using quarterly data.  We use annual data for Romania, in the absence
of quarterly numbers.  As we shall see, the estimates for these countries are
striking'ly  different.
Is it  possible that prices,  which are still subject  to many controls, have
lagged  behind  money growth sufficiently so  as  to create excess nominal  demand for
goods?  Is consumer demand for quasi-money balances merely a function of excess
monetary expansion, which forces savings, or is it an outcome of anticipated
1This  paper  was  funded  by  a  World  Bank  project  on  formerly  planned
economies.  We would like to thank Jong-goo Park for suggesting the topic, and
Fabrizio  Coricelli  and  Adnan  Mazarei  for  helpful  discussions.inflation as well  as real  income?  Finally, is it possible  to use observed
variables to derive a measure of the unobserved "true" rate of inflation, if
prices are indeed, repressed?  This question has been addressed in Feltenstein
and Farhadian  (1987) and Portes and Santorum  (1987) as well  as others.  The
approach we  use here is  based  upon Feltenstein, Lebow, and  Van  Wijnbergen (1990),
and, in particular, Feltenstein and Ha (1991).
Let us now turn to a simple  model that may help to answer the questions we
have posed.  The next section will derive our analytical model, while Section 3
will present  estimation results.  Section 4 will derive certain  conclusions
concerning the  extent  to which  the official  price  index  currently  reflects
repressed markets.
II.  The Model
We will suppose that the representative consumer's demand for speculative
and  precautionary  money  balances,  given  by  the  stock  of  quasi-money,  is  a
function of his real income and expectations of the rate of inflation.  The rate
of inflation he expects may not, however, correspond to the expected change in
the official  price  index,  since these  controlled prices  do  not  necessarily
reflect the shortages that he  may face.  We should note that this model does not
incorporate  the possibility of the foreign  sector as an  outlet for excess demand.
For  the  period  of  our  sample,  this  is  a  reasonable  omission,  given  the
restrictions on foreign trade imposed by the countries in question.  As the
countries open their foreign sector, our model would become less relevant.
Let IT  denote the "true" rate of in<Fation as perceived by the consumer.
That is, the demand for real quasi-money balances, qmd, is then given by:
log qmd =  aO + allog y + a2 f  E  (2.1)
where:
qm =  QM/PT  (2.2)
Here QM denotes quasi-money balances, y represents real income
2and  T represents the expected rate of inflation in the true
price index PT' where the true rate of inflation is given by:
uT =  log PT - log  PT-1  (2.3)
Thus, the true rate of inflation in equation (2.1)  may be interpreted as
that rate that would induce consumers to hold the observed level of quasi-money
balances in the absence of price controls.  Our aim will be to determine whether
or not this is significantly different from the official inflation rate.
Why do  we deflate quasi-money  balances by the true price index  rather than
the official price index since, in the absence of black-markets, the official
index represents the cost of current consumption?  Suppose that the consumer
expects  the  reform  to  succeed  and  hence  that markets  will  fully  clear  in
subsequent periods.  In  this case nT  will reflect  the cost of future  consumption,
since it reflects the consumer's best estimate of inflation in the absence of
price controls.  If,  on the other hand,  the consumer believes that price controls
will  never be lifted, then he should use the official price  index, w, as a
measure of the cost of future consumption.  In deflating by the true price index
we are therefore assuming that the consumer expects price controls to be lifted.
Although we have not done so here, one can test the alternative hypotheses of
future price decontrol versus no decontrol.2
The  normal specification of equation (2.1)  would be to have the dependent
variable be the total real money supply, that is (QM+M 1)/P.  Here we are using
an analogue of a Baumol-Tobin specification in which the consumer chooses to
divide  his  cash holdings  between  bank  deposits  and currency.  If there  is
increasing excess demand, and hence in our model increased repressed inflation,
then the "true" real interest rate on these savings deposits declines.  As the
"true" rate of inflation rises, then the relative gap between the real returns
2Feltenstein, Lebow, and Van Wijnbergen  (1990) carry out such a test for
China and determine that the hypothesis of future decontrol is  preferred to that
of permanent controls.
3on currency  and  on quasi-money  deposits  narrows,  even  though  the  real  return  on
quasi-money  always  remains  higher. The  consumex  can  hold  his  assets  in  the  form
of currency,  quasi-  money,  or goods,  but  the  presence  of repressed  demand  makes
increased  holdings  of goods impossible  to achieve immediately. Since goods
become  available  sporadically,  and  are  instantly  purchased,  it is  essential  that
the consumer  have cash  readily  available  to make purchases.  Interest  bearing
deposits  are  not  fully  liquid,  and  so  will  not  be  available  if  the  consumer  needs
to suddenly  make  a purchase. Currency  thus  becomes  relatively  more attractive
to the consumer  than .uasi-money  deposits,  leadirg  him  to reduce  his interest
bearing  depoolts. 3 Thus the  liquidity  differences  between  currency  and  quasi-
.oney  deposits  cause  the consumer  to be willing  to forego  the slightly  higher
real returns  offered  by quasi-money.
We  use  the  ratio  of  the  broad  money  balances  to retail  sales  to  measure  the
deviation  between  "true"  and  official  inflation.  Here  broad  money  is  defined  as
the  sum  of currency  and  consumer  holdings  of  bank  deposits. The  idea  is  that  an
increase  in  the  ratio  of  the  rates  of  growth  of  broad  money  and  retail  sales  may
reflect  the  existence  of repressed  demands  caused  by price  controls. 4 Let  M2
be the  broad  money  balance,  which  is equal  to stock  of currency  in circulation
plus  households  bank  deposits,  P  be the official  price  level  and  R be the real
volume  of consumer  retail  sales. We then set:
log  PT = log  P + alog (M 2/PR)  (2.4)
Thus if  a =  0  then the  true  and  official  rates  of inflation  are  equal.  If,  on
the  other  hand,  a =  1, for  example,  then  a 10  percent  increase  in  the ratio  of
money  to retail  sales  will cause  the true rate of inflation  to be 10 percent
31t should  be noted  that the phenomenon  of substitution  of currency  for
quasi  money  occurs  in  many  high  inflation  countries  even  without  the  presence  of
price  controls. Thus,  for  example,  in  the 1923  German  inflation  the  real stock
of fixed-interest  rate  deposits  fell  much  more rapidly  than did  the  real stock
of MI.
4This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  an increase  in  money,  in  the  absence  of
price  controls,  must go entirely  into  consumption.
4higher than the official rate.  Thus we use a measure of monetary overhang to
determine the differtnce between true and official inflation rates.5 It should
be noted that we would expect that a S 1 a-.  we  equation (2.4)  may be written as:
log  PT - a  log(M/R) +  (1  - a) log p
or:
VT  a  Alog(M/k) +  (1 - a) it
Thus  if a S 1 any increase in official prices, that is, an increase in the
current  price  level  or,  equivalently,  an  increase  in  the  current  rate  of
inflation, would cause an increase in the rate of inflation in the true price
index.  However unless a =  0, that is, no repressed inflation, the increase in
ff  would cause a smaller increase in aT (is  a 5  0), thus reducing the divergence
between the two price indices and hence reducing tne degree of repression in the
price  level.  If a  >  1 then the above  specification would  be difficult  to
interpret.  Our estimations indicate, however, that a  is less than 1.
Implicitly, a value of a >  0 indicates that monetary overhang leads to
aggregate excess demand.  Walras' law ensures that the value of excess demand is
equal to zero, so there must be excess supply in some  markets, as  well as excess
demand in others.  It is therefore plausible that there might be price deflation
in those markets with excess supply.  If, on the other hand, prices are rigid
downwards, then we would not observe sectoral  deflation.  In  any case, given the
aggregate  nature  of  our  model  we  are  unable  to  investigate  sectoral  price
changes.
We will assume that inflationary expectations are determined according to
an adaptive pattern in  which the expected  value of  the true rate of inflation for
next  period depends upon the error  made in  predicting the true rate of inflation
for this period.  Thus:
5Feltenstein and Farhadian (1987) use a simpler measure in which there is
a  constant  factor between  the  true  and official  inflation  rates.  Another
approach to the specification  of repressed inflation in China is  given in Portes
and Santorum  (1987).
5fE  ~E  E3(i  (2.5)
T - rT-1'  1 T -1)2.
Here X  is an estimated constant that we hypothesize lies between 0 and 1.  In
addition, we will suppose  that the real stock of quasi-money balances, valued at
the true price level, adjusts with a lag to the desired level.  Accordingly we
haves
log qm - log qm-l =  T  (log qmd  - log qm.._)  (2.6)
where T  is a parameter to be estimated.
Thus  the economic interpretation  of  our model is  that the stock of currency
plus household  bank deposits  is exogenous and represents  nominal purchasing
power.  Consumers then  try to adjust  their interest-bearing  deposits on  the basis
of their anticipations of the true rate of inflation, as well as incoma.  It
seems plausible that the selection of quasi-money balances would be a consumer
choice  variable,  although  aggregate money  issue would  be  determined by  the
government.6
III.  Estimations
We will consider the three countries of our study in order.
a.  Czechoslovakia
We use quarterly data from 1980 to 1990.  To estimate the model, we need
5  series:  money,  quasi-money,  consumer  price  index,  household  income,  and
households purchase of consumption goods.  Our data sources are as follows (all
data is taken from International Financial Statistics:
a)  Money (Ml)  is  defined  as currency  outside  banks plus  demand deposits.
b)  Quasi-money: Quarterly data is available only from 1988.1 to 1990.4.
However annual data is available from 1980.  We assume that the seasonal pattern
6See De Wulf and Goldsborough  (1986)  as well as Feltenstein and Farhadian
(1987) for descriptions of the process of monetary creation in China.
6in each year prior to 1988 was the same as the average seasonal pattern of 1988-
1990.  We compute the average seasonal patten of 1988-1990, and use it together
with the annual data to generate the qvarterly data for the period from 1980 to
1987.  In this case, as in the cases of the two other countries of our study, we
have a problem with data cove.age.  Available data for  quasi-money balances does
not distinguish between personal and corporate deposits.  Therefore our data,
which shoa'ld  reflect only personal deposits, may be contaminated by corporate
deposits.  Anecdotal evidence indicates  that corporate  bank deposits are largely
in  the form  of checking deposits, and hence  would not effect our results.  In  any
case, until greater detail in the monetary accounts becomes available, we have
no alternative to using the current definition of quasi-money.7
c)  Consumer price index (CPI): This series is directly available on a
quarterly basis.
d)  Household income (Y): Neither annual  nor  quarterly data  is available
for this variable.  We therefore have to use a proxy as the scale variable for
the estimation of money demand.  We choose GNP for the following two reasons.
First, it is reasonable to believe that GNP and households income are highly
correlated.  Second, we do not have quarterly data of for any acceptable scale
variable other than GNP.
Quarterly  data  from  1988 to  1990  is available,  while  annual data  is
available for prior years.  The quarterly data prior to 1988 is  then constructed
in the same way as in b).
e)  Households purchase of consumption goods (R):  Unfortunately, we do
not have  any quarterly data for  this variable, although annual  data is available.
We therefore assume that the marginal propensity to consume is constant, so that
household consumption follows the same seasonal pattern as households income.
Based on this assumption, the quarter  J:r data is constructed in the same way as
in b).
7In previous work on China, Feltenstein and Ha (1991),  we determined that
corporate deposits were a stable  fraction of  broad money over a long time  period.
One  might  expect  the  same phenomenon  to  occur  in the  case  of  these  three
countries, although we do not have direct evidence to that effect.
7From the complete  model given by equations (2.1) - (2.6)  we derive a
reduced  form  for  estimations
qmm c  Ao +  Alyy  +  A2VT  +  A3qmm-,
where qmm =  log qm - (1 - B)log  qm-l
yy =  log y - (l - 3)log  Y_1
fT - i  +  a(log (M2/PR) - log (M 2/PR).1)
log qm =  log QM - log P - alog (M2/PR)
Ao '  TaOB  A1 D  Tal  A2 D  Ta 2 S  A3 =  1 - T
We search  for  the values  of a and B  to maximize  the  likelihood  function,
subject  to the  constraint:  1  <  X,  T  <  1.  We find  that  a =  0.09  and B =  0.08.
The  estimation  of the  reluced  form  is:
qmm  =  0.323 +  0.570yy - 0.108fTf  + 0.367qmm_,
(5.717)  (2.542)  (-0.476) (3.287)
R2 =  0.631,  H =  2.610,  log-likelihood =  123.248
The numbers in parentheses  denote t-statistics.  All coefficients  have the
correct sign, and, excert for the inflation  rate, are significant  at the 1
percent  level. The  parameters  of the structural  form  can  be solved  as
aO =6.378,  al =0.900,  a2 =  -2.132, T  =  0.633.
The  estimate  T  indicates  that  real  quasi-money  balances  take  about  (1-T)1?  S 0.58
quarters  to adjust  to the  difference  between  the  demand  for  quasi-money  and  the
actual  stock  in  the previous  quarter.
The  estimate  a - 0.09  indicates  that  when  the  growth  rate  of  money  stock
is 10 percent  higher  than that of the nominal  retail  sales,  the true rate of
inflation  will  rise  by  only  0.9  percent  above  the  reported  rate  of inflation.
8Intuitively, this  implies that there was  no significant repressed  inflation
during  the sample period.
W6  may  carry  out  a  formal  statistical  test  of  repressed  inflation
hypothesis  in the  following way.  The null  hypothesis  is that  there  is no
repressed inflation, i.e., Ho: a =  0.  The value of the log-likelihood function
under Ho is 122.5699.  The chi-square statistic is 1.356,  while the 0.9 value of
the chi-square is 2.71.  Therefore, we can not reject the null hypothesis.
The parameter X  =  0.08 indicates  that the expectation of inflation appears
to be revised fairly slowly.  A  formal statistical test fails to reject the
hypothesis of myopic expectations (Ho:  X  =  0).
Another interesting finding is that the coefficient of the true inflation
rate, nTr  is  statistically insignificant.  In fact the velocity of money  is
almost constant, so  that the official and the true inflation rates are virtually
identical  (see Figures 1 and 2).  The constant velocity thus  indicates that
inflation is not used to measure the opportunity cost of money holding.8 At the
same time, deposit interest  rates were fixed  at 3 percent from 1970 to 1990.  Our
results thus lead to the conclusion that the demand for  money in Czechoslovakia
is purely for transaction purposes.
What is the intuition behind our conclusion of a fixed true velocity of
money  in Czechoslovakia?  In a  typical developed  country we  expect  to see
significant fluctuations in  the velocity.  In the United States, for  example, we
see a rising velocity.  Czechoslovakia, like  most planned economies, has lacked
the variety  of  financial instruments that permit  substitution out of money.
Accordingly,  the  conclusion  of  a  constant velocity  is not  unexpected.  In
particular, the absence  of alterna_ive assets  means  that standard measures of  the
opportunity cost of holding money would not be relevant.
Our conclusions are summarized as follows:
(1)  There  was  no  repressed  inflation  or  forced  savings  in  the
Czechoslovakia during the period from 1980 to 1990.
8We should note that our model does not assume that the officially measured
velocity  of money  is constant.  In this case,  however, both the  officially
measured velocity, as well as our "true" velocity, are approximately constant.
9(2)  Demand for money was only for transaction purposes.
(3)  Inflationary expectations were almost myopic.
These  results support  the general  belief that  Czechoslovakia has had a long
history of conservative economic management.  Indeed, most current estimates
would claim that total  inflation during the  1980's, including any repressed
inflation, averaged only about 5 percent per year.9  It is useful to examine
price developments since 1990,  the end of  our sample  period, to see  if subsequent
events tend to support our conclusion that there was little repressed inflation
in Czechoslovakia.
The economy was liberalized in a single "cold-turkey" program on January
1,  1991,  in which  prices  covering  about  85 percent  of  the  value  of total
transactions were liberalized.  At the time, it was anticipated that inflation
would rise to about 30 percent.  This would be caused largely by the shift to
world prices among CMEA members.  Tight fiscal and monetary policies were to
simultaneously be imposed.  In fact, prices rose by about 50 percent at the
beginning of 1991, rather than the targeted 30 percent.  The main cause of this
outcome seems not to have been repressed inflation, however, but a drastic fall
in GDP which reduced tax revenues and created inflationary pressures via budget
imbalances.  After credit policy was adjusted to compensate for the unexpected
price increases, inflation was virtually eliminated for  the second half of 1991.
It  may be useful, in this  context, to note a  recent paper, Drabek, Janacek,
and Tuma (1992),  that surveys current literature  on inflation in Czechoslovakia.
Examining the period 1985-91, the general conclusion  cif  a number of the relevant
articles is that hidden, or repressed, inflation ranged from about 0.5 to 2
percent annually in the consumer market.  These figures are so low as to give
support to our conclusion that there was no statistically significant repressed
inflation in Czechoslovakia.
We may thus conclude that casual  evidence for 1991 supports our contention
that repressed inflation  has not been a  problem for Czechoslovakia.  We have also
9See, for example, The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. an Economv in
Transition (1990).
10considered the question of whether or not the adaptive expectations framework
might be improved upon, that is, would a different estimation approach lead to
different  conclusions.  Accordingly,  we  have  carried  out  an  alternative
estimation,  using  a technique  similar to that developed  in Lane  (1992) for
Poland.  The  results  suggest also  that  there  was  no  significant  repressed
inflation in Czechoslovakia during the sample period and the expectations of
inflation were myopic.10
Let us now turn to the quite different case of Poland.
b.  Polandll
As in the case of Czechoslovakia, we estimate the model for the sample
period from the first quarter of 1980 to the second quarter cf 1990.
To  estimate the model we need five time series:
consumer price index (CPI),




a)  CPI:  This series (from 1980.1 to 1990.2) is directly available.
b)  Ml:  the  data  from  1983.1  to  1990.2  is directly  obtained  from
International Financial Statistics, a TSP file provided by the World Bank, and
Historically Planned Economies:  A Guide to the  Data (1992). Data for  the fourth
quarters of 1980  to 1982 is  also available from IFS.  We then generate quarterly
data for 1980 to 1982 by using the seasonal patterns of 1983-90.
c)  QM:  We have quarterly data from 1'86.1 to 1990.2, and the data of
the fourth quarters of 1980 to 1985.  Using the seasonal pattern of 1986, we
construct the quarterly data from 1980 to 1985.
d)  RETSALE: the index of nominal retail sales (from 1983.1 to 1990.2)
10 See Annex 1 for details.
lWe  would like to thank Fabrizio Coricelli for providing us with the data
used for our estimations.
11is  given by data supplied by the World Bank.  The growth rates over 4 quarter
periods from 1983 to 1987 are almost constant, and then increase rapidly after
1987.  We have therefore chosen to assume that the growth rate of retail sales
from 1980  to 1982  was similar to that from 1983  to 1987.  Therefore, we construct
the seasonal data from 1980  to 1982 by assuming  that the growth rate was the same
as the average growth rate from 1983 to 1987.
e)  Y:  This series is not available.  To find a proxy to this series,
we follow the same procedure as in Feltenstein and Ha (1991), where household
income is assumed to equal retail sales (or  private consumption) plus changes in
household asset holding.  This assumption is reasonable in centrally planned
economies  because  other  financial assets, such as  stocks or  bonds, are  not
available and the only means of saving is to hold currency and bank deposits.
To employ this procedure, we must have data on nominal retail  sales.
Unfortunately only its index number is available.  However, retail sales to the
private sector constitute the main part  of private consumption.  The  data we need
is the quantity of money transactions.  Since personal credit and private loans
were not available in centrally planned economies, retail sales to the private
sector are  essentially equal to  private consumption.  The  only difference between
these two variables would normally  be that private consumption includes farmers'
self-produced goods as well as retail purchases.  However, the share of self-
produced goods  in private consumption is very small.  Using China, where 75
percent of the total labor force is rural, as an example, retail sales to the
private sector accounts for 95 percent of private consumption.  We therefore
believe that using private consumption as a proxy  for retail  sales will not
change our results.
The annual data for private consumption is available.  We thus construct
quarterly data for private consumption, using the seasonal pattern of retail
sales.
We search for the values of a and 3  to maximize the likelihood function,
subject to the constraint: 1 c  X, T  <  1.  We find that a =  0.58 and B - 0.84.
12The estimation of the reduced form is:
qmm =  -0.359 + 0.363yy - 0 .323sT + 0.744qmm_
(-4.109) (5.575)  (-8.818)  (8.745)
R2 =  0.956,  H =  0.570,  log-likelihood =  71.206
The  numbers  in parentheses  denote t-Btatistics.  All  coefficients  have the
correct sign, and are significant at the 1 percent level. The parameters of the
structural form can be solved as
aO =-1.402,  a1 =1.418,  a2 =  -1.262,  T  =  0.256.
The estimate T  indicates  that real quasi-money balances take about (1-T)/T  =  2.9
quarters to adjust to the difference between the demand for  quasi-money and the
actual stock in the previous quarter.
The estimate a =  0.58 indicates that when the growth rate of money stock
is 10 percent higher than that of the nominal retail sales, the true rate of
inflation will rise by 5.8 percent above the reported rate of inflation.  This
implies that there was repressed inflation during the sample period.  Figure 3
shows the deviation between the true and the official price index during the
period.
Formal statistical test of repressed inflation hypothesis is carried out
as follows.  The null hypothesis is that there is no repressed inflation, i.e.,
Ho: a = 0.  We therefore set a =  0 and search for a value for B  by using the
maximum  likelihood  technique mentioned  above.  The value  of  log-likelihood
function under Ho is 49.045.  The chi-square statistic is 44.322,  while the 0.99
value of  chi-square  is 9.21.  Therefore, the  null hypothesis  is decisively
rejected.
The parameter B  =  0.84 indicates that the expectation of inflation appears
to be revised fairly rapidly, as might be expected in an economy with a rapidly
changing institutional structure as well as a rising inflation rate.  Formal
13statistical  test  rejects  the  hypothesis  of  myopic  expectations  (Ho:  8  =  0),  and
the  hypothesis  of  perfect  foresight  (Ho:  3  =  1). This  confirms  the  specification
of adaptive  expectations.
The official  velocity  of money, V  =  PR/M, where P  is the officially
reported price series, was  rather smooth prior to 1987, but it has been
fluctuating  sihce  1987.  We define  the true velocity  of money as VT =  PTR/M,
where  PT is  the  true  price  level. As pointed  out  by Feltenstein  and  Ha (1991),
the hypothesis  of constant  true  velocity  is equivalent  to a =  1 in this  model.
Setting a  =  1, the value of log-likelihood  function  equals 60.821.  The
hypothesis  of  constant  velocity  is  then  statistically  rejected.  This  conclusion
is thus an example of how our approach  does not require a constant "true"
velocity  of money.  Rather, in presents  a testable  hypothesis  which, in thic
case,  is  rejected. Finally,  Figure  4 compares  true  and  official  inflation  rates
This result  is thus quite different  from  Feltenstein  and Ha (1991)  who
applied  a similar  model to China.  They found that the officially  measured
velocity  was  decreasing  and  the  true  velocity  was  constant  (i.e.,  a  = 1)  in  China
during  1979  to 1988.  Since  the  estimated  value  of a is smaller  in  Poland  than
in  China,  one  may conclude  that  the  extent  of repressed  inflation  is  weaker  in
Poland  than in China.  Alternatively,  this finding  may reflect  the fact  that
greater price liberalization  has occurred  in Poland  than in China, or, as
indicated  in  Lane (1992),  that  there  is  considerable  substitution  between  money
and  black-market  assets  in  Poland,  while  there  may  be less  such  substitution  in
China. Indeed,  the  presence  of alternative  black-market  assets  may  explain  the
difference  from  our  results  on Czechoslovakia.
Another  interesting  finding  is  that  the coefficient  of inflation  rate is
statistically  significant,  even  if  the  official  rate  of inflation  is  used. That
is,  the coefficient  of ?T is significant  even if a is set  to 0.  This result
indicates  that  the  official  rate  of  inflation  plays  some  role  in  household  demand
for  real  balances,  although  it  not  as  satisfactory  a  determinant  of  money  demand
as the true rate of inflation. This is different  from  the results  for  China,
where  official  inflation  rate  does  not  play  a  role,  but  true  inflation  rate  does.
14It is also different from the results for Czechoslovakia where neither official
nor true inflation rates play a role in determining money demand.
Our conclusions are summarized as follows:
(1)  There  was repressed inflation  and  forced  savings in  Poland  during the
period from 1980  to 1990.  However, the officially reported price level has been
converging to the true price level since 1987.
(2)  Inflationary expectations were neither myopic nor did they exhibit
perfect foresight, although expectations adjusted fairly rapidly.
(3)  Neither the official nor the true velocity of money was constant.
Indeed, velocity has been fluctuating significantly since 1987.
(4)  The true rate of inflation, estimated by the model, performs better
significantly better than the official rate as a  measure of the opportunity cost
of money holding.  The official rate also plays a role in determining money
demand.
It may be useful to compare our findings with those of a recent paper by
Lane (1992).  Here an error correction estimation technique is  used to estimate
a  money  demand  model  for Poland.  Unlike  the  narrow  range  of  explanatory
variables used in our paper, Lane's approach incorporates information on black
markets in commodities and in foreign exchange.  Thus it is difficult to make
direct  comparisons, although certain similarities  do  emerge.  Lane concludes  that
household money balances adjust fairly rapidly toward their equilibrium level.
our conclusion, reflected in the estimated  value of T  is  that  quasi-money balance
adjust to their  equilibrium level as consumers  substitute between  money and
quasi-money.  Thus, as in Lane, money holdings are not passive,  although we
cannot replicate his findings about substitution between money and black-market
assets.
Let us  briefly consider if  recent  events in  Poland support  our conclusions.
Beginning in 1989 the Polish government began to reduce direct controls over a
gradually increas.  spectrum of prices, and  by the end of 1990  almost 85 percent
of retail prices were freely determined.  At the same time there was, initially,
an  extraordinary burst of inflation.  In  the fourth  quarter of 1989 the  wholesale
15price index rose by 65 percent over the previous quarter, while in the first
quarter of 1990 it rose  by an additional 550  percent.  Prices then stabilized and
in the second quarter of 1990 the wholesale price index increased by only 1.5
percent.  This trend continued in the third quarter of the year, while in the
fourth quarter a relaxation in monetary policy caused inflation to increase to
a monthly rate of about 5 percent.
We may thus  conclude that there appears to be evidence supporting our
notion of repressed inflation.  Indeed, it  would seem that price liberalization
brought about a  once-and-for-all price adjustment, at  the beginning of 1990,  that
eliminated monetary overhang and corresponding repressed inflation.
Let us now turn to Romania, the final country in our study.
c.  Romania
Unlike Czechoslovakia and  Poland, quarterly  data is  not  available, at least
to us, for  Romania.  We have  therefore estimated our model using annual data from
1975 to 1990.
In order to estimate the model we need the same five series as before:
consumer price index (CPI),




a)  CPI, Ml and QM:  The time series for CPI, Ml and QM are directly
obtained from World Bank data.
b)  RETSALE: the series retail sales is given in an unpublished World
Bank document.
c)  Y:  This series is not available.  To find a proxy to this series,
we follow the same procedure as in Feltenstein and Ha (1991), where household
income is assumed to equal retail sales (or  private consumption) plus the change
in household asset holding.  This assumption is justified in the same manner as
in the case of the previous countries.
16We search for the values of a and n  to maximize the likelihood function,
subject to the constraint: 1 <  X, T  <  1.  We find that a =  1.14 and £ =  0.91.
The estimation of the reduced form is:
qmm = -0.651 +  0.921yy - 1.333 irT  +  0.280qmm-.
(-7.199) (8.632)  (-8.885)  (3.508)
R2 =  0.964,  H =  0.107,  log-likelihood =  35.497
The numbers  in parentheses  denote t-statistics.  All  coefficients  have the
correct sign, and are significant at the 1 percent level.  The goodness-of-fit
and H-statistic are satisfactory.  The parameters of the structural form can be
solved as
aO -0.904,  a1 =  1.279,  a2 =  -1.851,  T  =  0.720.
The estimate r indicates that real quasi-money balances take about (l-r)/r  =  0.4
quarters to adjust to the difference between the demand for quasi-money and the
actual stock in the previous quarter.
The estimate a =  1.14 indicates  that when the growth rate of  money stock
is 10 percent higher than that of the nominal retail sales, the true rate of
inflation will rise by 11.4 percent above the reported rate of inflation.  This
implies that there was high repressed inflation during the sample period, as
shown in Figure 5.
Formal statistical test of repressed inflation hypothesis is carried out
as follows.  The null hypothesis is that there is no repressed inflation, i.e.,
Ho: a =  0.  We therefore set a =  0 and search for a value for  3  by using the
maximum  likelihood  technique mentioned  above.  The  value  of  log-likelihood
function under Ho is 26.935.  The chi-square statistic is 17.124,  while the 0.99
value  of  chi-square  is  9.21.  Therefore, the  null hypothesis  is decisively
rejected.
17The parameter n =  0.91 indicates  that the expectation of inflation appears
to be revised fairly fast.  Formal statistical test rejects the hypothesis of
myopic  expectations  (Ho:  3 =  0)  at  1 percent  significance  level,  but  the
hypothesis of perfect foresight (Ho: P  --  1) can not be rejected.
The  official  velocity  of  money, V  =  PR/M, where  P  is the  officially
reported price series, decreased by 70  percent from 1975  to 1990.  The following
test will show that the decline of velocity is  due to the use of official price
indices.  We define the true velocity of money as VT =  PTR/M, where PT is the
true price level.  As pointed out by Feltenstein and Ha (1991), the hypothesis
of constant true velocity is equivalent to a  =  1 in this model.  Setting a =  1,
the value of log-likelihood function equals 35.180.  The hypothesis of constant
velocity can therefore not be rejected.  Figure 6 indicates the extent to which
their is a divergence between the true and official velocities of money.
Our conclusions are summarized as follows:
(1)  There was severe repressed inflation and forced savings in Romania
during the period  from 1975 to 1990.  The situation does not seem to improve
toward the end of the sample period.
(2)  The adjustment  of inflationary  expectations  was quite rapid.  (3)  The
true  velocity  of  money  was  constant,  although  the  official  velocity  was
declining.
Given  the  limited availability of data  for Romania,  in particular the
absence of  quarterly price indices, it  is  difficult to use  the post-sample period
to  draw inferences about  the nature of  repressed inflation prior to  the beginning
of liberalization.  It  may be useful, however,  to quote a  recent study  by Demekas
and Khan (1991) to support some of our conclusions.
Although  it is extremely difficult to  estimate even  roughly the
monetary  overhang  resulting from the  fundamental changes  in the
demand for money taking place in a situation of systemic upheaval
and great uncertainty like  the one that occurred in  Romania in 1990,
the pattern of income velocity of money can be indicative.  Income
velocity of broad money at the end of 1990 in  Romania was about half
its level during the late 1970's and early 1980's, suggesting that
perhaps up to 50  percent of the money stock was involuntarily held.
18IV.  Summary and Conclusion
We have constructed a simple model that tests for repressed inflation by
estimating a "true" rate of inflation that explains behavior of observed money
demand.  We have estimated the  model using quarterly data for  Czechoslovakia and
Poland, and  using annual data for  Romania.  Although our results should be  viewed
as  preliminary,  given  the  imperfect nature  of  our data,  we  do  have  strong
evidence  that, prior to 1991, there was considerable repressed  inflation in
Poland  and  Romania,  while  there  was  essentially  no  repressed  inflation  in
Czechoslovakia.
We intend to further explore this topic by employing alternative methods
of estimation.  In  addit;on, as  more recent data becomes available, we  would like
to see if there is still any repressed inflation in either Poland  or Romania, or
if recent high rates of inflation  have caused it  to vanish, as indeed appears to
be the case in Poland.
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Estimation of Inflation through Error Correction Model
After  the  true  inflation  rate  is  derived,  as  in  the  framework  of
Feltenstein  and Ha  (1991), an error correction  model  (ECM)  (see Hendry  and
Richard (1982))  is estimated.  The ECM encompasses the partial adjustment  model,
and allows more general dynamic adjustment schemes (see  Burton and Ha (1990)).
The implementation of this approach first involves testing down from a
general autoregressive distributed lag model of the form,
n  n  n
=  aO  +  S  ptYt-w  +  .4.YA  X  8mt  >  +  Vt  (3.1)
t=  o  *-co  -ot-  +  CO
where M  is the  log of real  quasi-money balances,  Y  is the  log of  a  scale
variable, and Z is an opportunity cost variable, through the sequential deletion
of insignificant lags  on the basis of an F  test.  The resulting dynamic model may
then be rewritten in error correction form.  For example,  if the tested-down
model is given by
Mt  =  + Poyc  +  plyr-I  +  yoZt  +  Ylzt1  +  a1Mt-i  +  vt  (3.2)
then this may be reformulated as
&Mt  =  ao  - (1-81)  (Mt-,  - (1  + 8)  Yt-i  (y1  y1)  (33) (1- a  )  (-  )
+  PoAYe +  Y06zr  +  Vt
The term in square brackets is the deviation of real balances in  period t-1 from
their  long-run  equilibrium  value;  the  coefficient  (1  - 81)  captures  the
responsiveness of real balances to such deviations, and must be positive for
26stability.  The final step in the process is to estimate equation (3.3),  using
the deviations from long-run real balances calculated from the tested-down lag
model as the error correction variable in square brackets.
We estimate the model for Czechoslovakia, and find the following results
Aqmm =  0.001 - 0.260err-, +  0.27OAyy - 0.581AirT
(0.923)  (-2.268)  (2.116)  (-4.211)
R2 =  0.768,  D.W. =  2.244,  log-likelihood =  136.573
To compare the ECM with the partial adjustment model, we rewrite equation
(3.2) as
am,  =  (1  - 8')  (M'  - Mt1) - I 3 AYc  - Y  *AZc  + Vc  (3.4)
where M* can be calculated from the estimated long-run model.  It follows that
the partial adjustment model implies the restriction B1 =  Yl =  0.
We then estimate  (3.4), and test the hypothesis of a partial adjustment
scheme.  The chi-square statistic is 25.72, while the 0.99 value of the chi-
square is 9.21.  The result is thus in favor of the ECM.  Some aspects, however,
merit  comment.  We  estimate the ECM using  the  series of the true  rates of
inflation that are estimated from the partial adjustment model.  A formal test
of the ECM against partial adjustment models would involve estimating the true
rate  of  inflation  in both models.  However,  due  to  the  complexity  of  our
theoretical model, it  is  difficult, if  not impossible,  to estimate the  parameters
a and n  in  an ECM.  On the other hand, our estimates and tests suggest that there
was no  repressed inflation in  Czechoslovakia during the sample  period (a  = 0.09),
and the expectations of inflation were myopic (1 =  0.08).  It would then seem
useful to study  the money demand  dynamics in  the context of a  more general model.
27One may ask why we have not carried out unit root tests as part of this
study.  Unit root tests are important in examining the stationarity of a time
series.  Stationarity is a matter of concern in three important areas.  First,
a crucial question in the ARIMA modelling of a single time series is the number
of times the  series needs to be  first-differenced before  an ARIMA  model  is
fitted, as each unit root  requires a first-differencing operation.  Second,
stationarity of regressors is assumed in the derivation of standard inference
procedures  for regression models.  Nonstationary  regressors  invalidate many
standard  results  and  require  special  treatment.  Third,  in  cointegration
analysis,  an  important  question  is  whether  the  disturbance  term  in  the
cointegrating vector has a unit root.
The  relationship between  unit  root tests  and  error-correction  models relies
on the following conditions.  If all  the dependent variables have a unit root and
the error term of the long run model is stationary, then we should use the first
order  differences  of  the  dependent  variables  and  the  lagged  error  term  as
regressors, since all of them are stationary.
The theoretical background of the unit root tests is as follows.  A s3er
is defined as weakly  stationary if it has a finite mean, finite variance and
finite covariance, all of which are independent of time.  Consider an  (AR(1)
process
Y =  m + p  Y1 + e
where m and  p are parameters  and the e's are assumed to be  independent and
identically distributed with zero and constant variance.  The AR(l) process is
stationary if -1 <  p <  1.  If p=1 the equation defines a random walk with drift
and Y is then nonstationary.  If the process is started at some specific point,
the variance of Y increases steadily with time and  the unconditional variance is
infinite.  If the  absolute  value of  p  is greater  than  one, the  series  is
explosive.  Thus the crucial null hypothesis for  testing stationarity is  that the
28absolute value of p should equal one.  Since economic series are almost always
positively, rather than negatively, correlated the appropriate null hypothesis
is
Ho:  P  =  1
and the test of this hypothesis is a unit root test.
The  simplest way to test  the null hypothesis  is to specify the AR(1)
equation  as
AY  = m + yYl + e
where y =  p - 1, and AY is the first difference of the Y series.  Thus the unit
root hypothesis is now
HO: Y  =  0
The  OLS  test  produces  a t-statistic  for  ?, which may  be used  to test  the
significance  of  y.  The  t-statistic,  however,  cannot  be  2referred  to  the
critical values in the standard It,  table, since under the null hypothesis the
Y variable is nonstationary and this table no longer applies.  Fuller  (1976)
derived appropriate limit distributions for  the test statistic and  Dickey (1976)
computed  empirical  approximations for  selected sample sizes.  More recently
Mackinnon  (1990) has implemented a much larger set of replications than those
underlying the Dickey-Fuller tables.  In addition, he has estimated response
surface regressions over  these replications.  These response surfaces permit the
calculation of Dickey-Fuller critical values for any sample size.
The exposition so far has been in terms of the simple AR(1) process.  The
generalization to higher order processes can be most easily achieved by the use
of the lag operator L, where LY =  Y-1 etc.  The general autoregressive process
of order p, AR(p), may be written in the form
A(L)  Y  = m  + e
where A(L) is a polynomial of degree p in the lag operator, that is
29A (L)  = I  al.L - a2L2  -..- a'pLP
Replacing L  with one gives
A(1)  1  - - a2 - ...  - a 1
so that A(1) indicates the sum of all the coefficients in the autoregressive
scheme.  To test whether the pth order process has a unit root, rewrite A(L) as
A(L)  =  (1  - pL) B(L)
where B(L) is a polynomial of degree (p - 1) in the lag operator.  Replacing L
with one in this expression gives
A  (1) - (1  -p)  B(1)
Thus if the process has a unit root then A(1) equals zero, that is, the sum of
all the autoregressive coefficients will be zero.
Straightforward estimation of the AR(p) process yields estimates of theal
coefficients.  These do not permit a simple test of the null hypothesis since
these coefficients are all functions of the p parameter.  However, a simple test
can be obtained by rearranging the autoregression to isolate the p parameter.
The appropriate rearrangement is
AY =  m - A(l)Y. + 8 2AY 1 + 8 3AY-2 +  *--  AA-p
where  the  8  coefficients  are  functions of  the  a's.  Thus  under  the  null
hypothesis of a unit root the coefficient of Y-1 will be zero.  If p<l the
coefficient of Y-1 will be negative.  This regression is referred to as the
Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF) regression since the right hand side has been
augmented by lagged first differences of Y.
An important result obtained by Fuller is that the limit distribution of
the t-statistic on the coefficient of Y,1 is independent of the number of lagged
first differences included in the ADF regression.  Moreover, standard tables can
be  used  (at  least  asymptotically)  to  assess  the  significance  of  the6
coefficients.
30The cointegration tests consists of two steps.  The first step is to run
a  regression for  a long run model and record the regression residuals.  Step two
is to run the unit root test on the residuals.  It is important to notice that
the  unit  root  tests are  based on  limit distributions.  Thus  the tables  of
critical values that determine test results are valid only asymptotically.  The
tests may not make much sense when the sample sizes are small.  In this case,
inspecting the plots of the series and its differences may help checking the
stationarity.
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